REYES vs ZAMORA

Page 132 sa book: “The appellate administrative agency may even conduct additional hearings in the appealed case, if deemed necessary.”

Classmates, Ang haba ng facts, sareeeeh, para hindi tayo ma lost.

MARIO Z. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA as Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, MARSMAN and Co., Inc., and e.g. Vito, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46732 May 5, 1979

Facts:

Mario Z. Reyes is Credit and Collection Manager and Operations Coordinator of Marsman and Co., Inc. On January 17, 1974, the Company thru its Vice- President, E.g. Vito, suspended him indefinitely for "misappropriation of company funds."

The Company sponsored a sales promotional contest to advertise its pondocillin products. Evangeline R. Tagulao, won the first prize — a Volkswagen Beetle 1200. However, Miss Tagulao chose to receive the cash value of the car which was P24,000.00. The company issued a check amounting to 24k. The check was delivered to Miss Tagulao by Reyes, accompanied by his co-employee Victor Santos. Together, the three of them went to a bank to cash the check.

The company received two letters from Tagulao. The first one saying that she only received 20k from Reyes and that she expects to receive the balance of 4k. The second letter stated that Reyes explained that the remaining 4k will go to the consolation prizes. She didn’t complain because she thought what Mr. Reyes said was true, but she found out later on that the whole amount of 24k was due to her.

The company issued a check for the 4k and advised Reyes that he was being placed under suspension. . It also filed with National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on January 21, 1974, an application for clearance to terminate complainant's services.

Later on, another letter was received from Tuglao informing the company that she was returning the check for 4kbecause she ... actually received the full amount of 24k.

Reyes filed with the NLRC an "Opposition to Request for Clearance to Dismiss"

He alleged that "in spite of results of investigations tending to exculpate him from the charges, he has been placed under harassing situations to the prejudice of himself and his family ... and prayed that respondent Company be ordered "to immediately reinstate (him) to his former position with full back-salaries

The case was assigned to Mediator-Fact-finder Mirasol Corleto for mediation and/or fact-finding. After hearing, she submitted a "Mediation Report" to the NLRC wherein she found petitioner innocent of the charge of misappropriation and recommended his reinstatement with back wages. The NLRC issued an order adopting the findings of the mediator. From the NLRC’s order, both parties appealed to the Minister of Labor. The minister of labor’s decision ordered the reinstatement of Reyes with back wages.

Respondents Company and E.g. Vito filed a Motion for Reconsideration The Minister of Labor, Hon. Blas F. Ople, found the Motion for Reconsideration "lacking of merit" and denied the same. A Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents was again denied.

Respondents then appealed to the Office of the President, praying for the reversal of the Order of the Minister of Labor denying their motion for reconsideration.

The Office of the President decided the appeal after additional hearings were conducted by it. It reversed the decision of the Minister of Labor ordering the reinstatement of petitioner with backwages, having found Tagulao's "diamond ring story" implausible.

Issue: Whether or not the Office of the President may conduct new hearings

Held: Yes.

On the propriety/legality of the new hearings conducted by the Office of the President, the Solicitor General maintains that "(T)here is no law which prohibits the Office of the President from conducting additional hearings in an appealed case. Furthermore, it is by itself an administrative body and as such is possessed with fact-finding prerogatives, especially so when the purpose thereof is necessary, nay indispensable, to the proper adjudication of the case. In the case at bar, public respondent found the evidence on record wanting in some important factual aspects as to be able to determine whether or not petitioner's suspension and/or dismissal was justified. Thus it could not be said that public respondent abused its discretion in conducting additional hearings prompted as it was by its desire to render a correct and just decision."

Petitioner's bare allegation that the Office of the President acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in conducting a new hearing on appeal is devoid of merit. Firstly, if that were his belief, he should not have taken part in the hearing, and testified therein. ³¹ He should have taken proper legal steps to raise his objection at the earliest opportunity. With his participation and cooperation in said new hearing, he is now estopped from complaining that the Office of the President conducted new hearings on appeal. Secondly, petitioner can cite no law or jurisprudence to support his argument. For the truth is, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, "(T)here is no law which prohibits the Office of the President from conducting additional hearings in an appealed case" * and that the said Office "is by itself an administrative body and as such is possessed with fact-finding prerogative, especially so when the purpose thereof is necessary, nay indispensable, to the proper adjudication of the case." Further, the Solicitor General observed that the new hearing was necessary because "public respondent found the evidence on record wanting in some important factual aspects as to be able to determine whether or not petitioner's suspension and/or dismissal was justified."

WHEREFORE, let this Petition be as it is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the Office of the President dated November 12, 1975 — granting respondent company's application for clearance to terminate petitioner's employment is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. This decision is immediately executory.

Perla C. Bautista vs Board of Energy

PERLA C. BAUTISTA, GREATER MANILA FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS & DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF ENERGY (BOE), MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondents.

G.R. No. 75016 January 13, 1989

Page 135 sa book

Facts:

MERALCO filed with BOE a verified application for an upward revision of its rates. The application alleged among others, that MERALCO suffered net losses of P231.2 million in 1984 and P70.4 million in 1985 due to the devaluation of the peso, the drop in kilowatt sales, limited access to credit, high financing cost and charges of operations and maintenance and the deterioration of system loss. The application averred that the proposed rate schedule is an increase of 9.5 centavos per kilowatt hour in MERALCO's basic distribution charge which is 5.25% of the March 1986 average billing rate. However, consumptions up to 130 kilowatt hours per month of residential customers, and up to 70 kilowatt hours of small commercial customers, and consumptions of government-owned hospitals and public street lighting services are not affected by the increase.

In the same petition, MERALCO prayed for an ex parte provisional approval of the proposed rates anchored on the reasons that under its existing rate schedules, it expects to incur a total cash deficit from its 1986 operations in the amount of P918,317,000.00; that its operating income is not enough to cover the payment of the interests and amortization of its foreign loan, and that it is unable to maintain its distribution system to provide safe and efficient service. Attached to the petition are the affidavits of its key officers with supporting duly certified schedules, computations, documents and papers.

Perla C. Bautista and Greater Manila Federation of Jeepney Operators and Drivers Association, filed an "Opposition to the Application for the Increase in Rates" and prayed that no provisional approval should be granted by the BOE. They alleged that they, together with others similarly situated, are adversely affected by the increase in rates of MERALCO and that the increase in rates is exorbitant and unreasonable as the prices of petroleum products had already gone down .In an Order, the BOE provisionally approved MERALCO's revised rate schedules without hearing. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid order stating that they were not afforded the opportunity to be heard.

Issue: Whether or not the Board of Energy acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it provisionally approved ex-parte the application for increase in rates of MERALCO

Held:

The petition is devoid of merit.

The records show that the issue has become moot and academic as MERALCO decreased its rate by 12.6 centavos per kilowatt hour in its electric, bills for August 1986, apart from a 4.2 centavo cut per kilowatt-hour for September 1986.

Assuming that this case has not yet become moot, it is beyond dispute that when BOE provisionally authorized private respondent's application without hearing, it merely exercised a prerogative granted to it by law.

Section 12 of RA 6173, as amended by Section 11 of PD 1128 pertinently reads:

The Commission may, upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter, and without prior hearing, on the basis of supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief on motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after hearing, should the Commission find that the pleadings, together with such affidavits documents and other evidence which may be submitted in support of the motion, substantially support the provisional order.

The Court has upheld the authority of regulatory boards like the Energy Regulatory Board to grant provisional relief upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter, and without the need of prior hearing, but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter for the determination of its final decision. The order granting Such provisional relief, however, must be based upon substantial evidence — supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, and is without prejudice to rendition of a final decision after hearing.. In the case at bar, petitioners were given the opportunity to air their side and put to test the reasonableness of the revised rate schedules applied for during the hearings for the determination of the principal relief sought. The allegations, therefore, that due process had been denied to the petitioners are without basis, they themselves having participated at the hearing for the final determination of the application of MERALCO by the BOE.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.