Manotoc vs CA

: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house.

Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826 (case for the transfer of management), the Securities and Exchange Commission requested the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner

When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner. Petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Instance Corporation as surety. He contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to trave

Issue: Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond. (There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.)